World Economy

Powell Should Gladly Accept Trump’s Firing

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Powell Should Gladly Accept Trump’s Firing Powell Should Gladly Accept Trump’s Firing by Shanmuganathan N July 30, 2025 Indian Economy, World Economy If Powell had any sense for what lies ahead, he would accept Trump’s firing gladly.  Accompanied by the academic protests lamenting the lack of the Fed’s independence, etc, for the record books. If Trump had any sense for what lies ahead, he would allow Powell to remain in the chair and blame him subsequently when the US Housing Bubble 2.0 comes crashing down. Trump can at least have the satisfaction of saying “I told you so”. Why is Trump desperate to get the Fed funds rate down to 1% from the current 4.25 to 4.50% range? Two massive icebergs are on an imminent and direct collision course with the US Economy at this juncture, and these are: Bursting of the US Housing Bubble 2.0 Interest Expense as a % of Federal Income Headed into Uncharted Waters As Trump sees it, the only way to avoid the above issues is to lower the interest rates substantially. Readers should be aware that the current rate, aside from the ZIRP era following the GFC in 2008, is low from a historical perspective. But even these are not sufficient to maintain the bubbles. Trump Challenge 1 – The Housing Bubble 2.0 The peak of the median housing prices in the current cycle occurred in Q4 2022 at $442,600. As of Q1 2025, the median sale price was $416,900. While a 5% drop is not a significant correction, two factors do not bode well for a meaningful recovery: that this drop has occurred over 30 months, and the persistent high mortgage rates are keeping affordability at an all-time low for US consumers.    The previous 30-month period’s drop in housing prices occurred from Q4 2017 to Q2 2020 (a period during which the Fed funds rate increased from 1% to 2.5%), after which the COVID-19 stimulus and a return to ZIRP reversed the declining trend in housing prices. Trump wants to orchestrate a similar move now – reduce interest rates and inject massive fiscal stimulus through the Big Beautiful Bill. The only other period in which we have witnessed an extended drop in housing prices this century was during the 2008 housing bubble. Between Q1 2007 and Q1 2009, housing prices declined by more than 20%. Only a combination of ZIRP and QE – both unprecedented monetary measures – halted this decline. So as far as Trump’s eye can see, the solution to the problem of a housing crisis is a combination of ultra-low interest rates and expansion of the Fed balance sheet. The fact that, on the two occasions this was done – done after 2008 GFC and during Covid-19 – there were no deleterious consequences to talk about – would probably make Trump conclude that this extraordinary monetary stimulus can be done today as well. But why can’t the housing process recover without the above measures? The housing price increases have far outpaced the growth in median incomes. The Atlanta Fed’s Home Ownership Affordability Index (HOAI) – a composite index that takes into account housing prices, principal and interest payments, as well as taxes and insurance – is at an all-time low. This index is even below the levels that led to the bursting of the housing bubble in 2008. A level of 100 indicates that housing prices are affordable to buyers, given the current mortgage rates. The current score as of Apr 2025 is 65 – well below what makes the median house affordable to the median buyer. There are only two acceptable ways to increase affordability – either increase median wages or reduce interest rates. As Trump sees, all roads seem to lead to lower interest rates. There is, of course, a third way (an unacceptable one, though) to increase affordability – a dramatic decline in housing prices. Given that a housing bust will be accompanied by a decrease in employment, wages, and taxes, housing price declines must rival the effects of the above to lead to an increase in the Affordability Index. A drop of at least 30% would be required to bring the index into the affordable category. A 20% decline caused the 2008 crisis, and that too, from much lower levels of housing prices. Once again, it is easy to see why Trump is arguing vehemently in favour of substantially lower rates to stimulate the housing market. Trump Challenge 2 – Interest Expense as a % of Federal Income If the housing bubble bursting is an imminent danger in the months ahead, the Interest expense of the federal government is a current millstone around Trump’s neck. From less than 20% during Q1 2022, the interest expense as a % of Federal revenues has increased to 35% during Q1 2025. Readers might recall that the Fed hiked rates from nearly 0% during March 2022 to nearly 5.5% by July 2023. The US National debt has also increased from $30 trillion in Q1 2022 to more than $37 trillion today. A legitimate question would be whether this is not the first time we have crossed 30%, as there were two earlier periods: the 1980s decade, when this averaged more than 40%, and the years immediately prior to the 2008 GFC. 1980s was a period in which the debt-to-GDP was less than 40% – less than one-third the current debt-to-GDP ratio of 125%. The interest expense was high primarily because the Fed funds rate was in the double digits. As these rates declined, despite the debt growing faster than the GDP throughout the 1980s, the government was quite able to manage the interest obligations without threatening to take over the Fed’s primary role. Today, we are in a situation that the Fed would prefer to call “Fiscal Dominance,” i.e., the rates must necessarily be held low due to excessive government debt. Regarding the years preceding the GFC in 2008, the debt-to-GDP ratio was still less than 60%, allowing

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Moody’s Meaningless Downgrade of USA

Leave a Comment / Democracy and Institutions, Public Policy, World Economy /

Moody’s Meaningless Downgrade of USA Moody’s Meaningless Downgrade of USA by Shanmuganathan N June 5, 2025 Democracy and Institutions, Public Policy, World Economy Moody’s downgraded the US Government’s credit rating on May 16th from AAA to AA1, citing the uncontrolled increase in government debt over the years. Moody’s also forecasted the debt-to-GDP to rise to 134% (98% in 2024) and the annual deficits to widen to 9% (from 6.4% in 2024) by 2035 as the rationale for the downgrades. The specific numbers are not very important at this stage, and in any case, Moody’s estimates are massive underestimates even from a 2030 perspective, let alone 2035. But more importantly, the agencies are missing the “Forest For The Trees” in their analysis. If one understands the actual state of US Government finances, anything more than a JUNK rating would be an overvaluation. The only significance of the recent downgrade is that this is the first time in more than 100 years that all the major rating agencies have downgraded the top-tier credit status the US Government had hitherto enjoyed. Before the numbers, readers must understand the unique position of the US Government. It is the ONLY government in the world where the external debt can be denominated in the currency it can create out of thin air. No other government has this privilege. That said, this was essentially an “earned” privilege due to the record budget and trade surplus that the US was running under the Gold Standard for more than a century and a half before the formal Bretton Woods agreement in 1944. The US Dollar also maintained its purchasing power over the period: viewed in terms of gold prices, the US Dollar had declined in value from 1/20th an ounce of gold during 1800 to 1/35th an ounce of gold by 1971. That is about a 75% decline in purchasing power over 180 years – almost a steady-state condition in the context of what has happened after 1971. Now for some numbers used by Moody’s: The number almost always used in the context of debt is the National Debt and that is nearing $37 trillion. The US GDP in 2024 was about $29 trillion and so the debt-to-GDP is already at 127%. It is unclear why Moody’s is reporting a lower debt-to-GDP at 98%, but this is probably because of excluding specific categories of debt. It could also be the case that they are using nominal GDP and not real GDP. But as I said in the beginning the specific numbers are not relevant in the context of the US. Let us assume the debt-to-GDP is 200%. Will the US Government default under those conditions? Not in the traditional sense of the word “default” i.e. non-repayment of the US Dollars owed. The US government can always print; even if the debt-to-GDP is 1000%, it does not need to default. Greenspan summarized this best when he said “The United States can pay any debt it has because we can always print money to do that. So there is zero probability of default” So, the debt-to-GDP condition reaching 134% or even 200% does not imply a default as it would for almost any other country. Now comes the critical question – if the probability of default by the US Government is ZERO under any debt condition, and it indeed appears to be the case, as Greenspan stated, then what are these rating agencies even measuring? – It is the default mechanism available to governments in general and, more specifically, to the government that owns the world’s reserve currency, “Default Through Monetary Inflation (DMI).” DMI is a mechanism in which lenders lose not the absolute amount of the currency they lent but the vastly decreased purchasing power of the currency they receive from the borrower. For example, if the borrower had been promised $100 at the end of 5 years during a time of stable prices (i.e., price inflation is zero or close to it) and if the government ran an annualized price inflation of 20% over the subsequent 5 years, then the lender would have lost almost 60% in terms of today’s purchasing power of the currency. The readers need to understand that the mechanism of DMI is an option specifically available only to governments and not to private borrowers. In practical terms, receiving the promised quantum currency that has lost 60% of its purchasing power is the equivalent of taking a 60% hair-cut on the debt with the currency retaining its purchasing power. The latter is indeed an honest default and a preferable option. Therefore, the PRIMARY RISK rating agencies have to measure the US Government against is DMI, not the normal default mechanism that they do for other countries/companies. From the perspective of DMI, the probability of losing substantive purchasing power of US Dollars over the next few years is 100%—maybe even near 100% of the purchasing power, i.e., hyperinflation, and that is increasingly looking like a probable scenario. The Numbers – Deep Dive Though Moody’s focussed on debt-to-GDP as well as deficit %, the latter is not a very meaningful indicator and can display wide fluctuations on an annual basis. The debt-to-GDP on the other hand, is a summary of the historical deficits to date and hence reflects the pattern of US Government spending over decades. Think of debt-to-GDP as the Balance Sheet and the deficit % as the Profit and Loss statement – it will be clear why we should focus on the former from a rating perspective. As one can observe, debt-to-GDP has been on an upward trajectory since 2000, and it has gone up from 55% to over 120% today. This has happened in the context of what is seen as spectacular prosperity – booming stock markets (Dow has gone from 11,000 to 42,000 in the last 25 years) and relatively stable prices (CRB Index has gone from 150 to 360 for a CAGR of 3.5%). This 120+% continues to increase as the annual

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“China Vs US” Tariff Wars – A Repeat of “David Vs Goliath”

Leave a Comment / Indian Economy, Indian Liberals, World Economy /

Highlights of Tamil Nadu’s First Economic Survey – 2024-25 “China Vs US” Tariff Wars – A Repeat of “David Vs Goliath” by Shanmuganathan N May 2, 2025 Indian Economy, Indian Liberals, World Economy Like the David-Goliath battle, China is poised to emerge victorious—once economic fundamentals are clear, it’s evident the real sinking ship is the US economy The world is in the middle of an escalating tariff war between US and China. The reverberations have been felt in most markets worldwide, and with no signs of a backdown by either country, the road ahead appears murky. However, that is only if one does not understand the principles of trade, currencies, and economics. As I see it, there is only one way this war will end – By China replacing the US as the dominant economic force on this planet and the US Dollar being replaced by Gold as the world’s reserve asset. The competitive advantage that China has created will stay for decades, similar to the US enjoying the dominant position during the entirety of the 20th century. Another definitive consequence of the trade wars is going to be downgrading of US treasuries from what is seen as the safest asset on the planet today to several notches below the current grade. The end game would be when the treasuries get downgraded to “near junk” status, but that is still a few years away. The decline of the US – both the economy and the Dollar – started almost very early in the 20th century, i.e., 1913, with the formation of the US Federal Reserve. But there was so much momentum and lead that the US had built up over the previous century under the classical gold standard that the decline was hardly noticeable. Similar to what Max Weber outlines in his chronicle of the decline of the Roman Empire, the culture of rugged individualism and liberty that the US was known for was conquered from within. The seeds of the precipitous part of the decline were sown much later in 1971 with the closure of the Gold Window. This ability to create “currency out of thin air” provided a carte blanche to the US Government to expand its powers within and outside the US.  This growth in government came at the expense of the private sector, which is the productive part of the economy. This restraint of gold on the government was first unshackled in 1913 with the formation of the Federal Reserve – and eventually removed entirely in 1971. Many readers may not be aware that the US Government was funded almost entirely through Tariffs on imports until 1914. Income Tax was introduced as a “soak the rich” plan to eliminate tariffs that were paid for by everybody, and instead, a small fraction of the population would pay Income Taxes. Donald Trump is right when he says Tariffs were used to fund the Government entirely at some point. But what he doesn’t know, or at least doesn’t reveal, is that Government expenses as a percentage of the economy used to be less than 2% at that point in time and not 24% as they are today. Trade – Who Benefits? With so much misinformation, it is better to start from the basics. At the outset, a trade benefits both parties involved in the transaction. When one buys a cake of soap from a retailer, it is because one prefers the soap to the currency used to purchase it. Similar is the case with the retailer who prefers your currency to the cake of soap. This is an immutable truth that trade benefits both parties involved, as otherwise, it would not happen. The trade occurs even in extreme cases of ransom/extortion because both benefit. A trade doesn’t imply that both parties benefit equally or even near equally. This is not only valid for the extortionist case above but also for legitimate transactions. For example, many customers have railed against NVIDIA for the exorbitant pricing using its “temporary” monopoly power in a specific category of chips. But in all these cases, it is indeed a voluntary transaction as NVIDIA is not forcing any company to buy its chips. Customers are buying ONLY because they are better-off with these “overpriced” chips than without. Similarly, the US imports products from China only because the citizens/residents/users benefit. The follow-on question should be obvious at this stage: If trade benefits both parties, does it stand to reason that “tariffs” hurt both parties? Of course, yes. But in very unequal ways, as I will explain in this article. Now, before getting into the details of tariffs, it’s good to correct certain misperceptions regarding the popular biblical fable of “David vs Goliath”. The usual narrative of a “victory of the underdog” is a complete misrepresentation. The truth is that Goliath never stood a remote chance of defeating David in this battle. Before explaining, think of how to defeat Bruce Lee in a one-on-one duel: the answer is simple. While Bruce Lee might come with his karate paraphernalia, you go with a loaded rifle that has a 100m range, and shoot before Bruce Lee gets anywhere near you. Another example, how can one defeat Messi? Simple again: engage him in a game of chess. The path to victory lies in making the opponent’s strengths irrelevant in the battle. Change the frame of reference. That’s what happens in David Vs Goliath as well. The latter, Goliath, is a lumbering giant figure who comes to the battle with heavy armour, shields, and swords – essentially prepared for a short-range combat. David is an expert at defending his flock of sheep from lions and wolves using his sling with devastating effect. David can very accurately aim from hundreds of yards away and that’s exactly what happens in the famed battle. Goliath lasted all of a few seconds and did not stand a chance of getting anywhere near David to use his sword. For somebody who understands military warfare, Goliath

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War Against Tariffs, Not a Tariff War

Leave a Comment / Economic Reforms, Indian Economy, World Economy /

War Against Tariffs, Not a Tariff War War Against Tariffs, Not a Tariff War Ghanshyam Sharma April 17, 2025 Economic Reforms, Indian Economy, World Economy An elderly person watches the stock prices on a digital screen at the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) building in Mumbai. Indian equity markets slipped during Thursday’s trade after Trump announced tariffs on foreign imports to the US. Photo: PTI India has the third highest tariff rates among major countries. Iran and Venezuela are the other major countries with higher tariffs than India. According to the World Bank, India imposes a weighted average tariff rate of 11.5%. In comparison, China has a tariff of 3%, Pakistan has a tariff of 8%, Vietnam has a tariff of 1%, and Sri Lanka has a tariff of 4.4%. The countries in the European Union have a tariff of 1.3%. Australia has a tariff of 1%. The US has a tariff of 1.5%. Tariffs make imported goods expensive and force citizens to pay higher prices for low-quality local goods. For example, in India, laptops are 30% more expensive than in the United States. An average American is 33 times richer than an average Indian (USD 82,000 vs USD 2,500 GDP per capita). Coupled with this growing income disparity, such a steep price differential hampers skill development among youth. It’s been a fear for centuries that foreign competition threatens local industry and employment. In 1845, Frederic Bastiat petitioned the French government to protect the domestic candle manufacturing industry from foreign competition – the Sun. Bastiat argued that the Sun lights up people’s homes for free and reduces the candle demand. If the government could enact trade barriers such as prohibiting windows and blocking the Sun, people would be forced to purchase candles! Hence, protecting the domestic industry from foreign competition will increase demand, employment, and GDP. While Bastiat wrote a satire, a prominent labour union in the United States actually filed a grievance against goats in 2017. Western Michigan University had replaced the union members with goats to clear vegetation and landscape their campus. However, the labour union argued that the use of goats cost them their jobs and threatened their livelihoods. In a free world, people are paid somewhat proportionate to the value they add. Should we support policies that block the sun or bar the goats from grazing so people can have jobs even if these jobs add no value? Trade barriers such as tariffs do not contribute to human prosperity. They may generate employment in the short run but lead to long-term economic stagnation and decline. In reality, tariffs facilitate a transfer of resources from domestic consumers to affluent domestic industrialists. Tariffs safeguard the interests of domestic industrialists at the expense of common citizens. After the 1991 economic reforms, several business houses floundered in the face of foreign competition. The presence of tariffs eliminates competition for domestic industry and disincentivizes them from improving quality and reducing prices. Protected by tariffs, domestic industrialists use their resources to lobby with politicians rather than investing in research to increase competitiveness. Tariffs exist because domestic big businesses lobby for them. George Stigler (1982 Nobel Prize recipient in Economics) pointed out that big companies capture regulation at the expense of consumers. It is easier and more lucrative for a few big business houses to unite as an interest group and lobby for a favorable policy (such as tariffs). They face lower costs of coming together and a limited free rider problem. Further, the benefits are also concentrated. In contrast to big businesses, it is costly and difficult for millions of consumers to unite against unfair tariffs. The price increase due to tariffs is not enough to motivate them to skip their jobs or businesses to oppose the policy.  For example, while the United States imposes zero taxes on Indian drugs, India poses a 10% tax on US-made drugs. A 10% tax on imported drugs benefits a few pharmaceutical firms and hurts millions of Indian consumers. However, while the benefits accrue to a few pharma firms, the costs are distributed among millions of consumers. Hence, the people are unlikely to protest as it is rational for individuals to accept the unfair tariffs. India has been lowering tariffs since 1991. However, the tariffs have increased in the last 10 years. In 1991, India’s tariff rate on imports was 56.4%. India gradually lowered its tariffs to 26.5% in 2001. By 2015, India lowered the tariffs further to 7.3%. However, as per WTO estimates, the tariff rate had increased to 11.5% in 2022. In addition to increasing tariffs, India has increased non-tariff barriers to support organized producers. According to UNCTAD, India has increased the number of Non-tariff Measures (NTMs) against imports from 389 in 2012 to 582 in 2022. To make matters worse, India has increased the Frequency Ratio (the percent of imported products subject to NTMs) from 31.2% in 2010 to about 47%. It has also increased the Coverage Ratio (the percent of import value subject to non-tariff measures) from 42.5% in 2010 to 69 percent. Such measures have benefitted the organized producers at the cost of unorganized consumers. When India lowered tariffs in 1991, productivity, employment, and GDP growth increased. High-value jobs replaced the existing jobs. Several domestic firms became key players in global markets. Citizens were able to buy high-quality goods at lower prices. Therefore, India should lower its tariffs in response to President Trump’s threat of reciprocal tariffs. A stronger trade relationship between India and the United States will translate into an improved geo-political partnership between the two countries. Low import tariffs will benefit firms that manufacture exports as imported goods are used to manufacture exports. This may create short-term temporary job losses but will lead to long-term high-value employment and prosperity. The author is currently an Associate Professor of Economics at RV University, Bengaluru. The Author is a Honourary Research Fellow at AgaPuram Policy Research Centre.  Views expressed by the author are personal and need not reflect or represent the views

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GOLD – Is $3,000/Oz in 2025 Cheaper than $35/Oz in 1971?

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GOLD – Is $3,000/Oz in 2025 Cheaper than $35/Oz in 1971? GOLD – Is $3,000/Oz in 2025 Cheaper than $35/Oz in 1971? by Shanmuganathan N March 19, 2025 Economic Reforms, Indian Liberals, World Economy Gold prices have nearly doubled in the last 18 months from the lows of $1575/oz in September 2022. Despite the heady returns in a safe-haven asset, we are still in the early days of a super cycle that will last a decade or longer. As I explain in this article, gold prices are headed for levels most analysts cannot conceive of today.   What does “Cheaper than in 1971?” imply? During the decade starting 1971, Gold prices rose nearly 25 times to top at $850/oz by 1980. That is a 25-fold return in 10 years; a similar performance would mean a $75,000/oz price by 2035. What is the probability of that happening in the decade ahead? As I explain in this article, it’s a probable event but not a certainty. At least, not yet. What is almost certain is the target of $24,000/oz, as explained in the book “RIP USD: 1971-202X …and the Way Forward”. Undeniably, even the much lower target of $24,000/oz would still be a spectacular bull market in Gold. What caused gold prices to go up 25 times during the 1970s? DeepSeek gave several reasons: the end of the Bretton Woods System, High Inflation and Stagflation, US Dollar Weakness, Geopolitical Uncertainty, Increased Investment Demand, and Central bank policies. All of these are indeed valid proximate reasons, yet DeepSeek misses out on THE fundamental reason, i.e., Price catching up with Value. The proximate reasons are nearly irrelevant in the big picture. Without the deep discount between Price and Value as it prevailed back then, none of the proximate reasons would have increased gold prices appreciably. Gold was money from about 2800 BC until 1971. In 1980, the market priced gold at a level that would have allowed for the restoration of the Gold Standard, enabling Gold-Dollar convertibility at a fixed rate. This property of being the free market choice of money determined the value of gold in dollar terms during the 1970s; it is the same reason that is playing out today. Incidentally, when the gold window was closed in 1971, all the paper economists (i.e., the Communists, Keynesians, and the Friedmanites) unanimously predicted that the price of gold would fall well below $35/oz. It was forecasted that the price of gold would fall to $10/oz, accounting only for the industrial demand. Only to see gold prices go up 25 times in the next 10 years. The graph shows that the markets had priced gold at a level where the value of gold held at Fort Knox would have backed about 55% of the US money supply (M1). The US Federal Government could have restored the Gold-Dollar convertibility standard, with the US Dollar defined as 1/600th of an ounce of gold in 1980 / 1981. Most forms of the Gold Standard have operated with a 40% backing by bullion, and technically, the US could have transitioned to the Gold Exchange Standard that prevailed before 1971. Incidentally, the Bank of England had operated on a Gold Standard from 1717 to 1931 using a 40% reserve ratio. Ronald Reagan, a supporter of limited government and the Gold Standard, missed the last opportunity to close the Pandora’s box that Richard Nixon had opened in 1971. It is not to argue here that a 40% reserve ratio is the correct adaptation of the Gold Standard. Anything less than 100% backing is “stealth inflation”, and as long as Governments are in charge of the money supply (either through a Central Bank or with a regulatory system as was the case in the US before 1913), we are going to have the Fractional Reserve Banking system. There is no getting away from that. The point to be recognized is that even this 40% backing is vastly superior to our current unbacked paper monetary system. How high can gold prices go? – What does the above “Gold Stock – M1” graph imply for a return to the Gold Standard today? The ratio as of Q1 2025 is 0.035, and to achieve a 40% backing of the current money supply (M1), gold prices have to be about $35,000/oz. At this point, the key question is, what would the money supply be 10 years later?  That would indicate whether the current bull market in gold can rival what happened during the 1970s. Forecasting M1 Growth Two factors account for the substantive increase of M1 since 2008. Increase in National Debt: The accumulated National Debt from 1789 to the end of 2007 was a little over $9 trillion. In the subsequent 16 years, starting in January 2008, we have increased it by $27 trillion, and the National Debt today stands at $36 trillion. Increase in Federal Reserve Ownership of the National Debt: The US Fed owned less than 5% of the National Debt until 2007. However, since the 2008 GFC, the US Fed has monetized an increasingly more significant portion of the federal deficits, and this percentage increased to 10% by 2010 and 20% by 2022. The trend of the US Federal Reserve owning an increasing percentage of the National Debt will likely continue. This is for geopolitical reasons, as the US Government has practically weaponized the US Dollar since the Ukraine conflict. Most countries have their price inflation / recessionary issues to deal with. So, the tendency to either pay down the National debt (e.g., Japan) or stimulate the economy (e.g., Germany) by selling the US Dollars held would only increasingly leave the US Fed as the only buyer for the US National Debt. To project this forward, even if we assume that the M1 is set to grow at a CAGR of 10%, it will grow from the current $18.5 trillion to $48 trillion over the next 10 years. With a 40% reserve backing, gold prices would have to be well

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